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INTRODUCTION 
The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA) changed the substantive 
provisions that defined Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS), a 
type of immigration benefit for children.1  One of the changes, 
concerning a court predicate finding that the child’s “reunification 
with one or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, 
neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law” was 
generally agreed to mean that reunification was not viable when the 
child suffered such mistreatment from at least one parent, and not 
necessarily from both.2  In 2012, however, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court espoused a different interpretation of the provision, supporting 
its view by consulting interpretative canons, vertical legislative 
history, and administrative decisions.3  Other high and appellate level 
courts have declined to follow the Nebraska decision, but this 
decision is not an outlier.4  In 2014, the New Jersey Superior Court 
agreed with the Nebraska Supreme Court and reinforced support for 
the interpretation with direct quotations from the TVPRA 
Congressional records.5  The narrow interpretation propounded by 
Nebraska and New Jersey has the alarming potential to foreclose 
relief for many children seeking SIJS.6 
                                                                                                                 
 1. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(d)(1), 122 Stat. 5044, 5074 (2008)(codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) 
 2. See, e.g., In re D.A.M., 2012 WL 6097225, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012); In re 
Mario S., 954 N.Y.S.2d 843, 849 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2012); Brief for Appellant at 8, In re 
Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 646 (Neb. 2012) (No. S-11-000919), 2012 WL 10785183; 
DEBORAH LEE ET AL., UPDATE ON LEGAL RELIEF OPTIONS FOR UNACCOMPANIED 
ALIEN CHILDREN FOLLOWING THE ENACTMENT OF THE WILLIAM WILBERFORCE 
TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2008 (2009), 
available at http://www.ilrc.org/files/235_tvpra_practice_advisory.infonet.pdf; Jared 
Ryan Anderson, Comment, Yearning to be Free: Advancing the Rights of 
Undocumented Children Through the Improvement of the Special Immigrant 
Juvenile (SIJ) Status Procedure, 16 SCHOLAR 659, 672 (2014) (“In 2011, out of 
1,062,040 immigrants obtaining legal permanent residence status, only 1,609 obtained 
legal status through SIJS.”); Jennifer Baum et al., Most In Need but Least Served: 
Legal and Practical Barriers to Special Immigrant Juvenile Status for Federally 
Detained Minors, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 621, 622 (2012); Megan Johnson & Kele Stewart, 
Unequal Access to Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: State Court Adjudication of 
One-Parent Cases, A.B.A. (July 14, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/
committees/childrights/content/articles/summer2014-0714-unequal-access-special-
immigrant-juvenile-status-state-court-adjudication-one-parent-cases.html. 
 3. See In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639 (Neb. 2012). 
 4. See, e.g., In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
 5. H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014). 
 6. Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2. 
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Since 2012, the United States government has anticipated an 
increasing number of unaccompanied immigrant children arriving in 
the United States.7  The increase in unaccompanied immigrant 
children also means a corresponding increase in the amount of 
potentially SIJS-eligible children.8  Consequently, state court judges, 
as well as family and immigration law attorneys, will increasingly 
confront the question of who is or is not eligible for SIJS.  Some states 
that will receive incoming unaccompanied children have not 
addressed the questions behind a SIJS petition for predicate findings 
in the past.  Thus, judges and attorneys will likely find themselves 
with little guidance on the issue from higher courts within their 
respective states. 
This Note argues that the provision in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) that requires a court to find that “reunification 
with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, 
neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law” is 
satisfied when a child suffered this type of mistreatment from at least 
one parent.9  Part I provides background information on SIJS 
generally.  It also discusses a history of the provisions for SIJS 
eligibility in the INA from its codification in 1990 and its major 
revisions in 1997 and 2008.  Part II examines the conflict between 
states in their interpretations of the plain meaning, intent, and 
legislative history of the provisions.  Part II also introduces and 
analyzes the decisions by three prominent states that have spoken 
directly to the issue of interpretation—New York, New Jersey, and 
Nebraska.  Part III advocates for the adoption of the New York 
interpretation of the SIJS provisions in the INA, which states that 
reunification is not viable when the child suffered mistreatment from 
at least one parent, and not necessarily from both.  Part III 
demonstrates that the New York interpretation best reflects the plain 
meaning and the legislative intent of the INA provision.  Part III also 
                                                                                                                 
 7. In fiscal year 2009, the Office of Refugee Resettlement, after referral by the 
Department of Homeland Security, admitted 6092 children.  The number in fiscal 
year 2010 was 8207. OLGA BYRNE & ELISE MILLER, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE 
FLOW OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN THROUGH THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: A 
RESOURCE FOR PRACTITIONERS, POLICY MAKERS, AND RESEARCHERS 10 (2012), 
available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/the-flow-of-
unaccompanied-children-through-the-immigration-system.pdf.  A congressional 
report showed the increase from fiscal year 2012 to 2014. LISA SEGHETTI ET AL., 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43599, UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: AN 
OVERVIEW 2 fig.1 (2014). 
 8. See infra Part I.E. 
 9. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2012). 
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discusses why policy considerations favor the adoption of the New 
York interpretation. 
I.  THE EVOLVING LANGUAGE OF THE SPECIAL IMMIGRANT 
JUVENILE STATUS PROVISIONS IN THE IMMIGRATION AND 
NATIONALITY ACT 
Part I of this Note provides background information on the 
evolution of the SIJS provisions in 1990, 1997, and 2008.  It also 
discusses SIJS generally and recent trends in child migration.  Part I.A 
explains the meaning of SIJS and the criteria required to qualify for 
SIJS.  Parts I.B, I.C, and I.D explain the SIJS provisions in 1990, 1997, 
and 2008, respectively, as well as the history behind the provisions 
and amendments. Finally, Part I.E discusses the increase of migration 
that began since 2011. 
A. What Is Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and What Are Its 
Criteria? 
SIJS is a type of special immigrant status that allows a defined set 
of eligible persons to obtain lawful permanent residence.10  The INA 
generally enables the federal government to grant a particular status 
to a certain amount of “special immigrants.”11  Several other “special 
immigrant” statuses are detailed under different sections of the 
INA.12  SIJS allows a recipient to immediately apply for lawful 
permanent residence based on a state court’s predicate factual 
findings,13 and provides the successful applicant with the opportunity 
to obtain United States citizenship after five years of lawful 
permanent residence.14  Congress introduced SIJS at the enactment of 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See N.Y.S. OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., ADMINISTRATIVE 
DIRECTIVE 11-OCFS-ADM-01, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) 2–3 
(Feb. 7, 2011), available at http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/policies/
external/OCFS_2011/ADMs/11-OCFS-ADM-01%20Special%20Immigrant%20
Juvenile%20Status%20%28SIJS%29.pdf. 
 11. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4) (2012).  “Special immigrants” are listed under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27) and include certain eligible Panamanian nationals under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(E), former citizens who may apply for reacquisition of membership 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(B), and immigrants who serve the Armed Forces of the 
United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(K). 
 12. See IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., Introduction and Overview to Special 
Immigrant Juvenile Status, in SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS FOR CHILDREN 
AND YOUTH UNDER COURT JURISDICTION 3-1 (2010), available at http://www.ilrc.org/
files/2010_sijs-chapter_03-sijs_overview.pdf. 
 13. See e.g., In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
 14. See N.Y.S. OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., supra note 10, at 3.  The 
applicant, however, is unable to confer immigration status on his or her parents. 8 
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the federal Immigration Act of 1990 in order to address problems that 
undocumented immigrant children often encountered in the state 
foster care system.15  These obstacles included the possibility of 
deportation, poverty, language barriers, lack of health care or health 
insurance, and the lack of access to public benefits.16  Further, 
unaccompanied immigrant children are generally vulnerable to harm, 
such as child trafficking, commercial sexual exploitation, drugs, and 
gangs.17  Lawful permanent residence in the United States allows the 
SIJS recipient to work legally, obtain financial aid for college, and be 
eligible for limited public benefits.18  Since enacting SIJS in 1990, 
Congress redefined it in 199719 and then further amended it in 2008.20  
As of 2008, for a person to be eligible for SIJ status and have a chance 
to apply for lawful permanent residence, the person must meet the 
following three criteria.21 
The first criterion is met based on the person’s involvement in 
some form of juvenile court proceeding, such as a guardianship or 
delinquency proceeding.22  In other words, a person “who has been 
declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States 
or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the 
custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or 
entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United 
States” meets the first criterion for SIJS eligibility.23  For example, a 
person may become “dependent on a juvenile court” because a court 
                                                                                                                 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II) (“[N]o natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any 
alien provided special immigrant status under this subparagraph shall thereafter, by 
virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this 
chapter.”); see also Maura M. Ooi, Note, Unaccompanied Should Not Mean 
Unprotected: The Inadequacies of Relief for Unaccompanied Immigrant Minors, 25 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 883, 890 (2011). 
 15. See N.Y.S. OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., supra note 10, at 2. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Wendi J. Adelson, The Case of the Eroding Special Immigrant Juvenile 
Status, 18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 65, 66 (2008). 
 18. See Ooi, supra note 14, at 890 (explaining the process by which special status 
paves the way for citizenship). 
 19. See Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440, 2469 
(1997). 
 20. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(d)(1), 122 Stat. 5044, 5074 (2008) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012). 
 22. IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., supra note 12, at 3-4. 
 23. See N.Y.S. OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., supra note 10, at 3. 
926 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
appoints her aunt as her legal guardian or because she was placed in 
delinquency proceedings and charged with car theft.24 
For a person to meet the second criterion (known as the “Non-
Reunification Finding”), a court must issue a finding that 
“reunification with one or both of the parents is not viable due to 
abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State 
law.”25  Full termination of parental rights is not required to meet the 
“non-reunification” criterion.26  The separation from a parent must be 
significant enough that a court would consider it unlikely that 
reunification is possible.27  For example, a person may meet the non-
reunification requirement if his or her parents relinquished their 
parental rights.28  Another example is a person who has suffered 
abuse by a parent and was placed in long-term foster care as a result.29  
The SIJS order should clearly indicate that reunification is not viable 
due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment of the child, as opposed to 
some other dissimilar reason.30 
The third criterion requires the SIJS applicant to prove that it is 
not in his best interest to return to his country of origin or last 
habitual residence.31  The same court that signs off on the first and 
second criteria may also include this third criterion.32  The juvenile 
court judge would need to sign an order certifying that the above 
findings are true.33  Alternatively, evidence for this criterion may 
come from other administrative or judicial proceedings.34  In addition 
to the three main criteria, there is a consent requirement with a 
limited purpose.35  Moreover, a person must be a “child” under the 
                                                                                                                 
 24. IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., supra note 12, at 3-4. 
 25. Id. at 3-3. 
 26. See id. at 3-4. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. at 3-5. 
 30. See id. at 3-6. 
 31. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii) (2012). 
 32. IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., supra note 12, at 3-7. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. As described by the Immigrant Legal Resource Center: 
  There are two requirements of consent under the SIJS law: (1) consent to 
the grant of SIJS in any case; and (2) specific consent for a juvenile court 
determination on a child’s custody or placement status if the child is in 
federal custody during removal (deportation) proceedings.   
  The first type of consent requires that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, through the CIS District Director, must consent to the grant of 
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status.  This consent is an acknowledgement 
that SIJS was not “sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status 
2015] DEFENDING ONE-PARENT SIJS 927 
INA, which is defined as someone who is under 21 years old and not 
married.36 
Although the other parts of SIJS merit their own discussion, this 
Note will focus on the Non-Reunification Finding.  To make factual 
determinations pursuant to the SIJS provisions, state courts must 
interpret the meaning of the rest of the federal provision that directs 
them to make such findings.37  States have produced two opposing 
interpretations of the phrase “reunification with one or both of the 
[applicant’s] parents is not viable,” and such divergence affects what 
the state courts consider to be a type of case that satisfies the Non-
Reunification Finding.38  The first interpretation, known as the “one-
parent SIJS” interpretation, allows a child to qualify for SIJS even 
when the child remains with or is actively pursuing reunification with 
one parent but not the other.39  A second interpretation considers the 
Non-Reunification Finding to mean generally that the child must not 
viably reunify with both parents.40  Under the second interpretation, 
the court may find that the applicant child cannot viably reunify with 
one parent only when it would be impossible to make the same 
determination for both parents.41 
                                                                                                                 
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than for the 
purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect or abandonment.”  CIS 
conflates consent with the act of approving an SIJS petition and, therefore, 
there is no separate consent application that needs to be made.  An 
approval of an SIJ application itself is evidence of this consent.   
  The second type of consent is rarer.  It applies only to children in federal 
custody who seek a juvenile court determination of their custody status or 
placement.  Children in federal custody who are deemed “unaccompanied” 
will be under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), Division of 
Unaccompanied Children Services (DUCS) (herein after referred to as 
ORR).  As such, children in federal custody seeking a juvenile court 
determination on their custody or placement status must first obtain 
“specific consent” from ORR.  This is a notable change.  Prior to the 
TVPRA, the specific consent had to be obtained from the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), which had policies and practices toward 
unaccompanied minors that were confusing, inconsistent, and detrimental 
for these youth. 
Id. at 3-7 to 3-8 (citations omitted). 
 36. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1) (2014). 
 37. See id. 
 38. Compare In re Marisol N.H., 979 N.Y.S.2d 643, 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), 
with In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 646–47 (Neb. 2012). 
 39. LEE ET AL., supra note 2, at 3–4; see also Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2. 
 40. In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 646–47. 
 41. Id. 
928 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
B. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status in 1990 
The 1990 provisions define a SIJS-eligible person as: 
[A]n immigrant (i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile 
court located in the United States and has been deemed eligible by 
that court for long-term foster care, and (ii) for whom it has been 
determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would 
not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or 
parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual 
residence . . . .42   
For a person to be eligible for SIJS in 1990, he would need to be 
involved in some juvenile court proceeding and also show proof that 
it is not in his best interest to return to the country of origin or 
previous habitual residence.43  Notably, the language of the Non-
Reunification Finding is different from the current 2008 language.44  
In 1990, a court had to deem a person eligible for long-term foster 
care.45  This meant, at a minimum, that persons currently in long-term 
foster care were eligible, but also contemplated that persons could be 
“deemed eligible,” by a court determination.46 
In 1990, the SIJS statute passed with little controversy, and there 
was little discussion specific to the provision in the congressional 
record.47  Some sources suggest that, after the expiration of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, growing complaints 
that court-dependent juveniles had no avenue to regularize their 
immigration status motivated the enactment of the 1990 SIJS 
provision.48  Scholars report that social services agencies in California 
specifically advocated for immigration law to fill gaps that prevented 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978, 4978.  The 
incorporation of the “best interests of the child” findings requirement in SIJS was a 
progressive inclusion, given the absence of such a best interests of the child standard 
in immigration law. See Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a “Best Interests of the 
Child” Approach into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. 
L.J. 120, 124–25 (2009) (explaining that the United States developed the best interests 
of the child standard in family law proceedings to protect the needs and wishes of the 
child, but that it did not incorporate the same standard in immigration law). 
 43. See supra Part I.A. 
 44. See supra Part I.A. 
 45. Immigration Act § 153. 
 46. LEE ET AL., supra note 2, at 3. 
 47. See Heryka Knoespel, Note, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: A “Juvenile” 
Here is not a “Juvenile” There, 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 505, 507 
(2013). 
 48. See Katherine Porter, Note, In the Best Interests of the INS: An Analysis of 
the 1997 Amendment to Special Immigrant Juvenile Law, 27 J. LEGIS. 441, 443 
(2001). 
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certain children, with whom the social workers worked, from 
regularizing their status.49  The gap-filling function of SIJS was 
particularly relevant for such children to be able obtain lawful 
permanent resident status and naturalize.50  A regulation by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), under 58 Fed. Reg. 
42843, recorded the understanding of the law’s gap-filling effect at the 
time: “This rule alleviates hardships experienced by some dependents 
of the United States juvenile courts by providing qualified aliens with 
the opportunity to apply for special immigrant classification and 
lawful permanent resident status, with the possibility of becoming 
citizens of the United States.”51 
C. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status in 1997 
The 1997 version of SIJS defined a SIJS-eligible person as:  
[A]n immigrant who is present in the United States (i) who has been 
declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States 
or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the 
custody of, an agency or department of a State and who has been 
deemed eligible by that court for long-term foster care due to abuse, 
neglect, or abandonment; (ii) for whom it has been determined in 
administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the 
alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous 
country of nationality or country of last habitual residence; and (iii) 
in whose case the Attorney General expressly consent to the 
dependency order serving as a precondition to the grant of special 
immigrant juvenile status . . . .52 
Notably, the 1997 amendment added: (1) a requirement that the 
applicant child, who was dependent on juvenile court, acquire consent 
from the INS, and (2) the requirement that the applicant be “eligible 
for long-term foster care” needed to be specifically “due to abuse, 
neglect, or abandonment.”53 
Congressional documents suggest that the motivation to clarify the 
SIJS beneficiaries to limit abuse and clarify jurisdiction concerns 
influenced such changes.54  First, the 1997 House Conference Report 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See, e.g., Kirsten Jackson, Special Status Seekers: Through the Underused 
SIJS Process, Immigrant Juvenile May Obtain Legal Status, L.A. LAW., Feb. 2012, at 
20, 20–22, available at http://www.lacba.org/Files/LAL/Vol34No11/2893.pdf. 
 50. See Adelson, supra note 17. 
 51. 58 Fed. Reg. 42843 (Aug. 12, 1993). 
 52. Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440, 2469 (1997) 
(emphasis added). 
 53. See Porter, supra note 48, at 442. 
 54. See id. at 448. 
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explained that Congress changed the requirements in order to “limit 
the beneficiaries of this [SIJS] provision to those juveniles for whom it 
was created namely abandoned, neglected, or abused children.”55  
Senator Pete Domenici spearheaded the 1997 changes because he 
identified some instances of students who he claimed had fraudulently 
obtained SIJS status, where the students did not experience abuse, 
neglect, or abandonment.56  In practice, the consent requirement 
addressed both the concern about determining the role of the federal 
and state governments in the SIJS process57 and the concern over 
fraudulent claims by SIJS applicants who did not suffer abuse, 
neglect, or abandonment.58  The understanding by 1993 was that SIJS 
was a form of relief only for the benefit of abused, neglected, or 
abandoned children.  The 1997 amendment clarified this 
understanding by adding the requirement that eligibility for long-term 
foster care be specifically due to abuse, neglect, and abandonment.59  
The amendments to SIJS may have also been a result of litigation 
challenging juvenile court jurisdiction over children in deportation 
proceedings.60 
D. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status in 2008 
After 2008, the TVPRA, codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27), 
provides that: 
[A]n immigrant who is present in the United States—(i) who has 
been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United 
States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed 
under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an 
individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in 
the United States, and whose reunification with one or both of the 
immigrants’ parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, 
abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law; (ii) for 
whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial 
proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be 
returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or 
country of last habitual residence; and (iii) in whose case the 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of 
Children’s Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 1006 n.160 
(2002). 
 56. See Porter, supra note 48, at 448. 
 57. See id. at 447–49. 
 58. See Ooi, supra note 14, at 907. 
 59. See Porter, supra note 48, at 444 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)). 
 60. See id. at 441–42. 
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Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of special 
immigrant juvenile status . . . .61 
The TVPRA made procedural and substantive changes to many 
forms of immigration legal relief, including changes to SIJS.62  Most 
critically, the TVPRA eliminated the language “the juvenile is eligible 
for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment.”63  
Federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.11, enacted before the 2008 
changes, stated that the meaning of the phrase “eligible for long-term 
foster care” was that “family reunification is no longer a viable 
option” for the applicant.64  The regulation, however, did not help to 
alleviate the confusion because “family reunification” was equally 
undefined. Thus, only children in foster care were surely eligible for 
SIJS.65  Consequently, Congress declined to adopt the exact language 
of 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 in passing the TVPRA.66  Instead, Congress 
replaced the entire provision with new language that required a 
factual finding that a SIJS applicant’s “reunification with 1 or both of 
the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, 
abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law.”67  The 
TVPRA also significantly improved the language from “family 
reunification” in the federal regulation to specifying that it must be 
either “1 or both of the immigrant’s parents.”68  The TVPRA also 
added the phrase “or a similar basis found under State law,” instead 
of keeping the three bases originally listed—“due to abuse, neglect, or 
                                                                                                                 
 61. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(d)(1), 122 Stat. 5044, 5074 (2008) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (emphasis added). 
 62. See LEE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1. 
 63. Id. at 3. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. The language of the federal code of regulations differs from the enacted 
provisions in TVPRA 2008. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2014), with 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(27)(J) (2014]2). 
 67. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i). 
 68. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i), with 8 C.F.R. §204.11(a).  Moreover, 
the TVPRA used the phrase “not viable,” which does not imply the same inquiry into 
the past arrangement of the family as using the phrase “no longer a viable option.”  
The phrase “no longer” grammatically implies that a state existed in the past that is 
different from the current state described.  For example, one would say, “it was 
snowing before, but it is no longer snowing now.”  The phrase “no longer” would be 
grammatically incorrect if the state of existence were the same for the past and the 
present.  For example, it would not make sense to say, “it was not snowing before, 
but it is no longer snowing now.”  One would simply say, “it is not snowing.”  The use 
of the phrase “is not viable” in the TVPRA suggests that courts do not need to 
inquire about the past viability of family reunification. 
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abandonment.”69  The provision did not track the regulation’s 
language, which suggests that courts may consider a more expansive 
interpretation of SIJS than what the agency conceived.70 
The TVPRA also codified part of a system implemented by the 
INS and its successors in the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement 
(the “Agreement”) in 1997,71 through the adoption of some provisions 
of the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act in 2003.72  The 
events surrounding the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement 
occurred almost parallel to the creation of SIJS in 1990.73  In the lead-
up to the creation of the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement, 
child advocates sued the INS in 1990, alleging the mistreatment of 
unaccompanied immigrant children in immigration detention 
facilities.74  The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the INS, but the class 
of plaintiff children later reached a settlement agreement with the 
agency that gave unaccompanied immigrant children rights related to 
detention, transfer, and release.75  The Stipulated Flores Settlement 
Agreement created a three-pronged framework for the treatment of 
child migrants in immigration detention centers.76  First, the 
Agreement provided for rights and services to children under 
detention conditions, including services relating to legal assistance; 
adequate medical, dental, reproductive, and mental health; and rights 
relating to education, recreation, privacy, adequate interpretation, 
and the freedoms of religion and expression.77  Second, the 
Agreement provided for the right to prompt family reunification 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i). 
 70. See LEE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1. 
 71. Carla L. Reyes, Gender, Law, and Detention Policy: Unexpected Effects on 
the Most Vulnerable Immigrants, 25 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 301, 309–10 (2010). 
 72. In 2003, before the TVPRA, the Homeland Security Act took provisions from 
the proposed Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act and transferred the 
responsibility under the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement from INS to the 
Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).  
ORR extended the “best interests of the child” rationale to considerations of the 
treatment, transfer, and detention of unaccompanied immigrant children. See id. at 
310.  The rest of the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act reintroduced more 
provisions later. See 153 CONG. REC. S3001-01 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2007) (statement of 
Sen. Dianne Feinstein); see also 154 CONG. REC. S10886-01 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) 
(statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein). 
 73. See Reyes, supra note 71, at 309. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 310. 
 77. Id. 
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whenever possible.78  Third, the Agreement provided for the right to 
detention in the least restrictive detention setting possible.79 
The TVPRA came with little legislative history that spoke directly 
to the meaning of the SIJS provisions, but a component of TVPRA 
may provide some insight.80  Senator Dianne Feinstein, author of the 
Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2000, remarked during 
the passage of TVPRA on its changes that incorporated some aspects 
of the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement, which would give 
better procedural guarantees for unaccompanied children and 
prevent bad detention conditions.81  However, Senator Feinstein did 
not mention the inclusion of the changed SIJS provisions at that time. 
82 
In 2008, the TVPRA also codified changes to SIJS in response to 
the adoption of the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act.83  
The Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act included a section 
on SIJS,84 and Senator Feinstein has been reintroducing the Act since 
2000.85  In her 2001 introduction, Senator Feinstein emphasized that 
the bill’s intent was to improve procedural protections for 
unaccompanied immigrant children and also to “improve 
unaccompanied aliens’ access to existing options for permanent 
protection . . . .”86  Senator Feinstein emphasized the same intention 
in 2007 by stating that the Act “provides no new immigration benefit 
to unaccompanied alien children” by using the available benefits 
within current immigration law.87  These new SIJS provisions aimed to 
“streamline[] the Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) program.”88 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., supra note 12, at 3-5; see also H.S.P. v. 
J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 265–67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014). 
 81. See 154 CONG. REC. S10886-01 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Sen. 
Dianne Feinstein). 
 82. See id. 
 83. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). 
 84. Section 341 of the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2002 
entitled “Special Immigrant Juvenile Visa.”  See 148 CONG. REC. S3844-01 (daily ed. 
May 2, 2002). 
 85. See 146 CONG. REC. S9381-05 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. 
Dianne Feinstein). 
 86. 147 CONG. REC. S101-02 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein). 
 87. 153 CONG. REC. S3001-01 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2007) (statement of Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein). 
 88. See id. 
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The legislators struggled to streamline the language of the SIJS 
statute to improve access for those who suffered abuse, neglect, or 
abandonment.89  Over time, Senator Feinstein made many changes to 
the Special Immigrant Juvenile Status section of the Unaccompanied 
Alien Child Protection Act.90  First, the 2002 provision for the Non-
Reunification Finding expanded abuse, neglect, and abandonment to 
“[those] deemed eligible by [a] court for long-term foster care due to 
abuse, neglect, or abandonment, or a similar basis found under State 
law.”91  Then, in 2004, the proposed Act entirely removed the 
language on eligibility for foster care.92  Eventually, in May of 2007, 
the Non-Reunification Finding read that the applicant “should not be 
reunified with his or her parents due to abuse, neglect, abandonment 
or similar basis found under State law.”93  The provision’s language is 
almost identical to the language as it was passed, except for the “one 
or both” phrase which was added in 2008: “[W]hose reunification with 
one or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, 
neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law.”94  
The trend of the changes suggests three things: (1) the goal was to 
improve access to current immigration benefits, such as SIJS, instead 
of creating new ones; (2) the authors thought about and changed the 
language on eligibility for foster care multiple times; and (3) the 
authors expressly ruled out using language that would limit the 
inquiry to abuse, neglect, and abandonment by two parents.  
Moreover, the language of the Non-Reunification Finding saw 
constant expansion without modification from its first iteration in 
2002.95  The unchallenged expansion of the Non-Reunification 
Finding suggests that legislators did not look to these particular 
                                                                                                                 
 89. See Thronson, supra note 55, at 1006 n.160. 
 90. See 154 CONG. REC. H10888-01 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008); 153 CONG. REC. 
S6408-03 (daily ed. May 21, 2007); 150 CONG. REC. S11251-03 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 
2004); 148 CONG. REC. S3844-01 (daily ed. May 2, 2002). 
 91. 148 CONG. REC. S3844-01 (daily ed. May 2, 2002) (emphasis added). 
 92. The proposed Act provides:  
(i) who by a court order . . . was declared dependent on a juvenile court 
located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, 
or placed under the custody of, a department or agency of a State, or an 
individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the 
United States, due to abuse neglect, or abandonment, or a similar basis 
found under State law.  
150 CONG. REC. S11251-03 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2004) (emphasis added). 
 93. 153 CONG. REC. S6408-03 (daily ed. May 21, 2007) (emphasis added). 
 94. 154 CONG. REC. H10888-01 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (emphasis added). 
 95. See 148 CONG. REC. S3844-01 (daily ed. May 2, 2002). 
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provisions to address the concern that it “would encourage illegal 
immigration and immigration fraud.”96 
E. Recent Trends in Child Migration 
Since 2008, courts have had to confront the question of whether or 
not a one-parent SIJS applicant can meet the Non-Reunification 
Finding.97  Despite fears that SIJS “would encourage illegal 
immigration and immigration fraud”98 the reality is that, as recently as 
2011, the number of SIJS beneficiaries remained low, despite the 
expansions and clarifications in the law.99  In 2010, the Division of 
Unaccompanied Children’s Services (DUCS) Legal Access Project 
Providers reported that 22.8% of the children they screened were 
eligible for SIJS, with the raw number equaling 1604.100  In 
comparison, one record of the actual number of SIJS recipients in 
that year, which would include a total of many more children than the 
DUCS sample, was 1492.101  In fiscal year 2014, Customs and Border 
Patrol apprehended 68,541 unaccompanied immigrant children, 
representing a 77% increase from the figure in fiscal year 2013.102  If 
around 20% are eligible based on DUCS data, then, extrapolating 
from that data, 13,708 children could potentially be eligible for SIJS.  
Many would potentially receive no relief and be sent back to places 
where they would be vulnerable and in danger. 
                                                                                                                 
 96. 153 CONG. REC. H14098-01 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Lamar 
Smith). 
 97. Compare In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 645–47 (Neb. 2012) and H.S.P. v. 
J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014), with In re Marcelina M.-G., 
973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 722 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
 98. 153 CONG. REC. H14098-01 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Lamar 
Smith); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-405, at 130 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2941. 
 99. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 672 ((“In 2011, out of 1,062,040 immigrants 
obtaining legal permanent residence status, only 1,609 obtained legal status through 
SIJS.”); see also Jackson, supra note 49, at 22 (noting that in 2010, 1492 gained lawful 
permanent residence through SIJS, compared to the 1,042,625 people that acquired 
lawful permanent residence). 
 100. Byrne & Miller, supra note 7, at 25 fig.10. 
 101. Jackson, supra note 49, at 22. 
 102. Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-
children (last viewed May 19, 2015). 
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II.  NEBRASKA, NEW YORK, AND NEW JERSEY COURTS 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE “1 OR BOTH” LANGUAGE 
The legislative history of the TVPRA does not articulate whether 
or not it is in favor of allowing one-parent SIJS.103  Since 2008, states 
have differed in their interpretations of the Non-Reunification 
Finding’s language and the meaning of “1 or both.”104  Part II of this 
Note analyzes in particular the two opinions from the New Jersey and 
Nebraska courts that have diverged from the common understanding 
of the Non-Reunification Finding in chronological order.  Part II 
begins by analyzing the Nebraska case, which introduced the 
alternative interpretation of the “1 or both” language and introduced 
the controversy in the Non-Reunification Finding.  Part II then 
discusses a case in New York that represents the common 
understanding of the provision.  Finally, this Part discusses the New 
Jersey case, which revived the alternative interpretation promoted in 
Nebraska and added novel reasoning in support of that provision. 
A. In re Erick M.—Nebraska 
This decision was the first highest-level state court to directly 
address the interpretation of the “1 or both” language enacted in 
2008.  In 2012, the Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster County 
committed Erick M. to the care and custody of the Nebraska Office of 
Juvenile Services (OJS) for two charges of a minor in possession of 
alcohol.105  Later, Erick requested the juvenile court to issue SIJS 
findings.106  The juvenile court heard Erick’s motion for SIJS findings, 
but denied the motion after finding that Erick did not meet the Non-
Reunification Finding,107 which requires that the court find that 
“reunification with 1 or both of the immigrants’ parents is not viable 
due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under 
State law.”108  Erick’s mother testified that she had not been accused 
of Erick’s abuse, neglect, or abandonment.109  The family permanency 
specialist assigned to the case also testified that she had no contact 
information for Erick’s father and was unsure if the father was in New 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See supra Part I.D. 
 104. Compare In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 645 (Neb. 2012), and H.S.P. v. J.K., 
87 A.3d 255, 267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014), with In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 
N.Y.S.2d 714, 722 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
 105. In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 642. 
 106. Id. at 641. 
 107. Id. at 643. 
 108. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(i) (2012). 
 109. In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 643. 
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York or Mexico.110  Furthermore, the specialist added that she would 
continue to work with Erick’s mother, with whom Erick had lived 
before he was committed to OJS custody.111  The juvenile court 
determined that there was no evidence to show that Erick’s father 
abused, neglected, or abandoned him.112  Erick appealed the denial of 
SIJS findings.113 
The Nebraska Supreme Court identified that Erick M.’s appeal 
relied on the interpretation of the SIJS provision that requires a 
finding that “reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is 
not feasible because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.”114  In 
evaluating the this provision’s interpretation, the court took a “soft” 
plain meaning approach115 to the question of statutory interpretation, 
proposing to look strictly at the legislation’s text unless the plain 
meaning was unambiguous.116  The court defined an “ambiguous 
statute” as one that is “susceptible of more than one reasonable 
interpretation.”117  The court then concluded that it was reasonable to 
interpret the provision as disjunctive because of the use of “or.”118  
The court ultimately held, however, that Erick’s construction 
described one reasonable interpretation, but another reasonable 
interpretation could be that the “or” separates two different 
independent instructions for the court to follow based on the 
circumstances.119  The court did not specify, however, what it meant 
by a “reasonable interpretation.” 
After finding that the phrase’s meaning was still ambiguous, the 
court then analyzed the legislative history of SIJS.120  The court 
acknowledged that the 2008 amendments expanded the eligibility 
requirements for SIJS.121  In terms of the Non-Reunification Finding, 
the court articulated that the 1990 SIJS provisions required only that 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Id. at 642. 
 111. Id. at 642–43. 
 112. Id. at 643. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. With the soft plain meaning approach, the courts introduce additional 
considerations to aid them in determining the presumed intent of the legislators, 
which is evidenced solely by the words of the statute. See Ron Beal, The Art of 
Statutory Construction: Texas Style, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 339, 370–71 (2012). 
 116. See In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 644. 
 117. Id. 
 118. The government argued that, under Erick’s construction, the phrase “or both” 
would be superfluous but not unreasonable. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 644. 
 121. Id. at 645. 
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the child be eligible for long-term foster care.122  In 1997, an 
amendment to the Non-Reunification Finding provision added that 
eligibility for foster care must also be a result of abuse, neglect, or 
abandonment.123  The court explained that the intent behind the 
addition was to prevent applicants from using SIJS for the sole 
purpose of obtaining immigration status instead of obtaining relief 
from abuse, neglect, and abandonment.124  The court explained that 
“eligible for long-term foster care” had always meant that family 
reunification was no longer viable.125  Consequently, the addition of 
the phrase “1 or both” only slightly expanded the required finding, 
and that a court still has to evaluate the child’s viability of 
reunification with a “family,” similar to how an immigration agency 
or immigration court would analyze it.126 
The Nebraska Supreme Court then reviewed unpublished decisions 
by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), 
particularly Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) decisions, to 
guide its understanding of the “1 or both” parents rule.127  The court 
found that the AAO presumed that a parent who has never been in 
contact with the child has abandoned that child.128  Even with such a 
presumption, however, the court noticed that the AAO continued to 
evaluate the viability of reunification with the other parent.129  Thus, 
the court concluded that the “1 or both” language gives children who 
have one parent who is unknown or cannot be found the possibility of 
SIJS relief based on a finding concerning the other parent.130  
According to the court, the AAO method was in keeping with the 
intent to expand the pool of eligibility for SIJS.131  The court 
concluded that the cases demonstrate that the USCIS does not 
consider proof of one absent parent to be the end of its inquiry under 
the reunification component.132  Instead, the court expressed that a 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. at 646. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 647. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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petitioner normally has to show that reunification with the other 
parent is also not feasible.133 
The court envisioned two different scenarios: In one SIJS case, the 
child could potentially reunify with only one parent because the other 
is unknown.134  In another SIJS case, a child could potentially reunify 
with two parents.135  The court then discussed In re E.G., a 2009 New 
York case, where the child had one “absent” parent and one parent 
with whom the child lived.136  The New York court found that 
reunification with the known parent was not viable due to the 
parent’s abuse, neglect, or abandonment.137  Based on the court’s 
evaluation of the In re E.G. and AAO decisions, either an 
“unknown” or “absent” parent could trigger an extra inquiry on the 
other parent.138  The court then distinguished In re Erick M. from In 
re E.G.139  The court did not clarify, however, how such an inquiry 
would be different from a two-parent SIJS case where a court finds 
one parent to have abandoned the child and the other to have abused 
or neglected the child.140  The court seemed to insist that the inquiry 
of their novel interpretation was a one-parent inquiry.141 
The In re Erick M. court’s light treatment of legislative history and 
its reliance on administrative appeals decisions as a substitute for a 
more rigorous plain meaning analysis seems an odd departure from 
what one would expect from a statutory interpretation analysis.  
Other courts have generally declined to follow In re Erick M. and 
instead adopt the reasoning and interpretation in the next case. 
B. In re Marcelina M.-G.—New York 
In In re Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S.,142 the court also considered 
the interpretation of the “one or both” phrase.143  The case concerned 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Id. When revisiting this question, however, the New York court did find that 
some immigration cases also considered only one parent SIJS and granted status. See 
infra Part II.C. 
 134. In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d at 647. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 648 (citing In re E.G., 899 N.Y.S.2d 59 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Aug. 14, 2009)). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. 973 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
 143. The New Jersey court would later disagree with the In re Marcelina M.-G. 
decision. See H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).  The 
New York Court of Appeals has yet to rule on the issue. 
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Susy M.-G., daughter of Marcelina M.-G. and petitioner for SIJS 
findings.144  Susy lived with her mother and the mother’s ex-boyfriend, 
Tony, in Honduras.145  The boyfriend was “mean and violent,” so 
Marcelina threw him out of the house when Susy was six.146  When 
Susy was ten, Marcelina left Honduras to work in the United States 
and left Susy and her half-brother, Jason, in the care of their aunt 
Estella.147  Susy described her aunt as a “physically violent and 
verbally abusive” woman, who would call her names and use her 
mother’s money only for her own family.148  Susy’s father, Israel, was 
never a part of her life.149  Marcelina added that Israel was an 
alcoholic who was violent towards her.150 
A few years into living with Estella, Susy arranged to leave with 
her brother and illegally enter the United States.151  At first, 
Marcelina did not support this plan, but she later changed her mind 
and asked her boyfriend to help pay for the trip.152  In the United 
States, Susy and her brother reunited with their uncle, Francisco, in 
New York, where they enrolled in school.153  Susy lived with Francisco 
and also reunited with her mother, who lived nearby.154  Francisco 
filed for guardianship of Susy and Jason in family court.155  From the 
guardianship petition, Susy and her half-brother petitioned for SIJS 
findings.156  The guardianship petition alleged that Israel had never 
been part of the siblings’ lives nor provided for them, and that 
Marcelina had abandoned the family when she left Honduras.157  Susy 
filed a separate petition for SIJS findings and alleged the same facts, 
but added that Marcelina neglected her by failing to provide adequate 
food, clothing, shelter, and education, as well as by allowing her to 
take the perilous journey from Honduras to the Unites States.158  To 
                                                                                                                 
 144. In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.2d at 716 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 717. 
 156. Id. 
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 158. Id. 
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support her petition, Susy also submitted a letter from her caseworker 
indicating that she suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.159 
Although Marcelina initially supported Francisco’s guardianship 
petition, she later argued that it would be in Susy’s best interest to 
live with her, since Susy’s father did not have a relationship with 
her.160  She also argued that Susy wanted to live with her.161  The 
family court granted the mother’s custody petition but refused SIJS 
findings because Susy was “with her natural parent” and to rule 
otherwise would be a “strained reading of the statute.”162 
On appeal, the Second Department of the New York Court of 
Appeals gave an overview of the legislative history of SIJS.163  The 
court emphasized that SIJS is a process that involves a predicate 
order from the state court that is not an immigration status 
determination,164 because a SIJS applicant could then use the findings 
to obtain lawful permanent resident status from the USCIS.165  The 
court expressed that the 1997 changes to SIJS were motivated by the 
“concern that juveniles entering the United States as visiting students 
were abusing the SIJS process.”166  The court further supported such a 
characterization by quoting the 1997 Conference Report that 
legislators modified SIJS “in order to limit the beneficiaries of this 
provision to those juveniles for whom it was created, namely 
abandoned, neglected, or abused children.”167  The court compared 
the difference between the 1997 amendments and the 2008 
amendments.168 
The Second Department held that the family court erred in 
denying the motion for SIJS findings.169  It found that Susy was under 
twenty-one, unmarried, and placed under her mother’s custody in 
satisfaction of the other SIJS provisions.170  It also found that Susy 
established that reunification with her father was not viable due to 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Id. at 718. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 722. 
 164. The court uses the terms “predicate order” and “predicate findings” 
throughout the opinion. See id. at 719, 723. 
 165. Id. at 719. 
 166. Id. (citing Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
 167. Id. at 720. 
 168. See id. at 719–20; see also supra Parts I.C–D. 
 169. In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d at 721. 
 170. Id. 
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abandonment.171  The Second Department additionally implicitly 
accepted the family court’s SIJS rejection and its determination that 
the mother did not abuse, neglect, or abandon Susy.172  The Second 
Department implicitly accepted the family court’s conclusion that the 
mother did not abuse, neglect, or abandon Susy despite Susy’s 
allegations to the contrary.173 
The court adopted a different standard of statutory interpretation 
from In re Erick M., stating that the text was the “most compelling 
evidence of legislative intent.”174  Under this premise, it held that at 
least one treatise, two cases, and one law review article concluded 
that the plain meaning of the “1 or both” provision allows for one-
parent SIJS.175  The court held that its interpretation of the provision 
is the same.176  The court also looked to the legislative history and 
found more supporting evidence for its interpretation, despite the 
plain meaning’s clarity.177  Based on this analysis, the court supported 
the common understanding of the Non-Reunification Finding that the 
child meets such a requirement when the child suffers abuse, neglect, 
or abandonment from at least one parent and cannot viably reunify 
with that parent as a result.178 
The court’s characterization of legislative history in In re Marcelina 
M.-G. conveys the common understanding and characterization of the 
legislative history, 179 different from In re Erick M.180  In an overview 
of SIJS legislative history, the court explained that preserving the 
requirement that the applicant be deemed eligible for long-term 
foster care clearly indicated that “SIJS was only available when 
reunification with both parents was not possible.”181  It continued that 
eliminating such language and replacing it with the “1 or both” phrase 
indicated that only one parent’s viability needed to be examined.182  
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Such a difference in characterization implies a divergence in how the 
two courts view what level of meaningful variation is permissible 
when a statute’s language changes from one to another.183  The court 
also explained that such an expansion of SIJS “permits ‘more 
vulnerable and mistreated children to qualify for this form of legal 
relief.’”184  Moreover, the court added, despite fears that an expansion 
of SIJS would lead to a large increase in the granting of SIJS, SIJS 
was known to be a largely underused form of legal relief.185  SIJS 
represented one percent of the total amount of lawful permanent 
residencies granted to persons under twenty-one, even up to 2012.186 
After an examination of the general characteristics of the evolution 
of SIJS, the court also addressed the interpretation proposed in In re 
Erick M.187  The court noted that the Nebraska court declined to 
adopt the statute’s literal meaning in In re Erick M., unlike the literal 
reading that the New York court used in its own analysis of the 
statute’s plain language.188  The court argued that a statutory canon 
resolves that “ambiguities in immigration statutes must be read in 
favor of the immigrant.”189  The court did not dwell on this point, 
however, as it held that it would decide in favor of interpreting the 
provision to allow for one-parent SIJS for the other reasons it 
discussed.190  It also articulated a concern that foreclosing the 
possibility of SIJS for Susy may mean deportation to Honduras, 
where her father abandoned her and no other fit relatives can take 
care of her.191  Reflecting on Susy’s welfare if she returned to 
Honduras, the court clarified that the purpose of SIJS was 
“protect[ing] the applicant from further abuse or maltreatment by 
preventing him or her from being returned to a place where he or she 
is likely to suffer further abuse or neglect.”192 
The court again emphasized that the court’s role in making SIJS 
findings is not to make a determination of immigration status. It 
opined that Nebraska’s treatment of SIJS precluded the USCIS from 
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applying its own interpretation of the federal law,193 when both the 
state and federal governments were supposed to have a role in SIJS.194  
Furthermore, the court argued that the requirement for the 
Secretary’s consent addressed the concern that the relief granted 
would not be for abuse, neglect, or abandonment.195  It also 
challenged the assertion in In re Erick M. that the USCIS had not 
granted SIJS when looking at only one parent’s abuse, neglect, or 
abandonment, stating that the USCIS did make such grants of special 
status without looking at the viability of reunification with the other 
parent.196 
C. H.S.P. v. J.K.—New Jersey 
In H.S.P. v. J.K., the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the 
Nebraska Supreme Court’s In re Erick M. interpretation regarding 
the Non-Reunification Finding.197  Further, it expanded upon the 
analysis of the legislative history of SIJS by examining direct quotes 
from the Congressional Record around the passage of the TVPRA in 
2008.198  The court tried to further uncover the development of SIJS 
from a statute that had an unclear requirement about eligibility for 
foster care to one that more narrowly targeted abused, neglected, and 
abandoned children.199  It cited In re Marcelina M.-G.200 as holding an 
alternative interpretation without further treatment or rebuttal of the 
arguments made in the prior case.201 
In H.S.P., petitioner H.S.P. was the uncle of M.S.  H.S.P. sought 
custody of M.S., and together they applied for SIJS findings with the 
Chancery Division, Family Part.202  M.S. was born and raised in 
India.203  He had no recollection of meeting his father, B.S., but lived 
in “disease-ridden slums” with his mother J.K., who was the named 
opposing party in the case, acting cooperatively with the uncle in the 
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custody petition.204  Without adequate medical care, M.S.’s siblings 
died of illnesses, and his mother became terminally ill.205  M.S. then 
lived with his grandmother, worked a construction job at the age of 
fifteen, and developed back pain and a skin condition.206  M.S.’s 
mother and grandmother arranged for M.S. to travel from Turkey to 
Mexico, and then across the southern border of the United States to 
live with H.S.P.207  While living in New Jersey with his uncle, M.S. 
eventually obtained a General Education Development (GED) 
diploma.208  Included in the SIJS petition, J.K. requested that the 
court enter a default judgment against her, claiming that she 
“abandoned” M.S.209  However, the lower court did not find that there 
was sufficient evidence to show that “either of his parents” neglected 
or abandoned M.S.210  Consequently, petitioners appealed.211 
Initially, M.S. claimed that both of his parents abused, neglected, or 
abandoned him, rather than presenting a one-parent SIJS case.212  The 
court, however, took the opportunity to use the case to contemplate 
the meaning of the “1 or both” language in the TVPRA revision of 
the SIJS provisions.213  Before the court considered this question, it 
expressed concern that the petitioners brought the case primarily to 
acquire SIJS status and a green card, 214 suggesting that there may be 
an improper purpose for invoking the jurisdiction of the family 
court.215  The court bypassed this concern and held that M.S. did not 
meet the Non-Reunification Finding.216 
The court also addressed the petitioner’s claim that the father 
neglected and abandoned M.S. without naming the father in the 
complaint or attempting to serve him.217  The court stated that a 
parent should have a chance to oppose allegations of abuse or neglect 
and petitions from non-parents for custody of the child because such a 
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case “resembles the termination of parental rights.”218  An additional 
concern was that the parent may not have been reasonably located or 
that petitioner did not adequately attempt service.219  Finally, the 
court noted that there may be a possible conflict between the INA 
provision that the child “shall not be compelled to contact the alleged 
abuser . . . at any stage,” but left both of these concerns unresolved.220  
The concerns above were ultimately dicta because the court did not 
make a determination on those grounds.221  However, they reflect the 
way that the court viewed its role: as a gatekeeper of the country’s 
borders in matters affecting children’s welfare and immigration status, 
which may be a perspective that influences the persuasiveness of its 
overall statutory interpretation.222  Such concerns set the stage for the 
court’s holding in this case. 
The court interpreted relevant New Jersey state law to determine 
that the Non-Reunification Finding was satisfied with respect to 
J.K.223  It held that a failure to provide due to poverty did not meet 
the required element of willful, reckless, or grossly negligent behavior 
to constitute neglect under New Jersey law.224  Additionally, it held 
that the standard for “abuse,” under New Jersey law is relative.225  
According to the court, when a parent permits a child to work in 
particular conditions, it is only considered “abuse” if those conditions 
were contrary to the labor laws under which the child worked.226  As a 
result, it held that J.K.’s actions were not willful abandonment 
because she kept in contact with M.S. and only wanted the best for 
him.227  With respect to M.S.’s father, the court upheld the lower 
court’s finding that he willfully abandoned M.S. because his continued 
absence demonstrated his “settled purpose” to abandon his child.228  
The decision regarding the father and mother effectively transformed 
an allegation of two cases of parental abuse, neglect, and 
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abandonment into a one-parent SIJS case.229  Such an outcome 
allowed the court to move to considering whether the interpretation 
of “1 or both” in the INA allowed for one-parent SIJS cases.230 
The court held in favor of the In re Erick M. interpretation of the 
Non-Reunification Finding but omitted the textual analysis of the 
provision as was done in In re Erick M.231  The court then examined 
the legislative history of SIJS to determine if its interpretation of 
legislative intent supported or precluded the In re Erick M. 
interpretation.232  First, it looked at the Senator Domenici’s statement 
in a congressional hearing regarding the possible abuses in 
immigration law as well as a conference report discussing the purpose 
of the 1997 amendments.233  Senator Domenici expressed concern 
over the students’ ability to “manipulate the system to obtain 
permanent residence.”234  The conference report did not explicitly 
reiterate Senator Domenici’s concern, but it stated that the 
amendments to the SIJS provisions were meant to “limit the 
beneficiaries of [the Non-Reunification Finding] to those juveniles for 
whom it was created” and to ensure that the purpose was primarily to 
obtain relief from abuse and neglect, not to obtain an adjustment of 
immigration status.235 
In addition, the court studied the legislative history of the 2008 
changes.236  The phrase “1 or both” came with little explanation, but 
the court relied on two other statements to analyze the TVPRA’s 
legislative history.237  First, a statement from one of the senators 
stressed concerns about illegal immigration and immigration fraud, 
while Senator Dianne Feinstein, right before the bill’s passage, stated 
that, “[t]his legislation does not expand the current immigration rights 
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of any child.”238  Senator Feinstein continued, “[i]nstead, [the 
TVPRA] presumes that children will be placed in removal 
proceedings—unless they qualify for immigration benefits under 
current law.”239 
The court characterized the legislative intent of SIJS as 
“prevent[ing] the return of juveniles to unsafe parents,” but also 
“prevent[ing] misuse of SIJS statute for immigration advantage.”240  It 
concluded that allowing one-parent SIJS cases in general would be 
contrary to legislative intent because it would allow a child who can 
reunify with a “safe parent” to obtain SIJS status even if reunification 
with that “safe parent” would not lead to further contact with the 
“unsafe parent.”241  The court added that “or both” would be 
superfluous when interpreted to allow one-parent SIJS because the 
provision simply would have said reunification is not viable with one 
parent.242  For the H.S.P. court, the particular outcome for M.S. 
comports well with the legislative intent of the “protection of those 
abused, neglected, or abandoned juveniles whose compelled 
repatriation would place them in danger from a parent who abused, 
neglected, or abandoned them.”243  Assuming that the rejection of 
SIJS for M.S. meant his repatriation to India, the court may be 
satisfied that he had the option to return to his mother, the “safe 
parent,” whom the court found had not abused, neglected, or 
abandoned him.244 
III.  CONSIDERING THE MEANING OF “1 OR BOTH” AND THE 
INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION OF ONE-PARENT SIJS CASES FROM 
ITS SCOPE 
Although the three views slightly differed in their approaches, 
there is a noticeable pattern to statutory interpretation that can help 
to analyze and resolve the dispute between the two different 
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interpretations.245  First, courts look to the words explicitly used in the 
text.246  The words themselves are the source of interpretation 
whether or not the rule is to sort out ambiguous text247 or to rule out 
contradicting interpretations based on legislative intent.248  After 
interpretation of the text, the next step is to consult the legislative 
history, either to confirm a particular interpretation249 or to rule out 
interpretations that are contradictory.250  When faced with a provision 
that still defies direct interpretation from the text or history, a court 
may ask which interpretation best responds to the problem at hand. 
Part III of this Note argues that the text’s plain meaning,, the 
interpretative variations, and the statutory canons strongly point 
towards the one-parent SIJS interpretation.  Although the legislative 
history does not directly nor definitively favor one interpretation, it 
strongly implies the one-parent SIJS interpretation.  Finally, this Part 
considers why one-parent SIJS, which takes a small step towards a 
type of immigration policy that accepts children as persons, is a better 
answer than narrowing and gatekeeping. 
A. The Plain Meaning of the Text and the Legislative History in 
Support of the One-Parent SIJS Interpretation 
The plain meaning of the text of SIJS suggests that the provision 
allows for a one-parent SIJS interpretation.  The Nebraska court’s 
approach to statutory interpretation in In re Erick M. placed plain 
meaning above other forms of determining legislative intent.251  The 
Nebraska court does not consider legislative history or any other tool 
of statutory interpretation unless the text’s meaning is unambiguous 
on its face.252  By default, it looked to legislative history by proposing 
a “reasonable interpretation” to “or” in the phrase “reunification 
with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable” and concluded 
that a court should evaluate the viability of reunification with both 
parents unless viability of reunification with one parent is impossible, 
at which point a court could look to just one parent.253  However, the 
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court considered such a reinterpretation as sufficiently ambiguous to 
warrant consultation of the legislative history.254  Yet, it is difficult to 
imagine that Congress, despite contemplating a multitude of scenarios 
that could occur to abused, neglected, and abandoned children, chose 
to characterize its instructions of these scenarios in only two ways.  
Though a court can conceivably introduce ambiguity to the text, it 
does not follow that the text is ambiguous on its face.  Given that 
social context strongly influences a word’s meaning, it would be 
difficult to find a phrase or sentence that was not susceptible to more 
than one meaning.255 
The court in In re Erick M. also did not purely rely on the text for 
its interpretation, but looked at what administrative appeals decisions 
set forth.256  While evaluating the AAO decisions, however, the In re 
Erick M. court failed to analyze whether the decision looked at both 
parents’ abuse, neglect, or abandonment—instead of one parent’s—
was necessary to the holding for every case where it was challenged.257  
Even the approach used in In re Erick M. is not completely 
persuasive in indicating the phrase’s plain meaning because the AAO 
also heard cases where it evaluated only one of the parent’s non-
viability for reunification.258 
New York’s interpretation better captures the plain meaning than 
does Nebraska’s.  It is clearer that the use of the word “or” creates a 
disjunction, and this has always come to plainly mean that there are 
two requirements that are independently sufficient to satisfy a 
particular element or provision.259  Moreover, many thought that 
changing the SIJS provisions in 2008 would clarify the statue’s 
meaning, particularly that the meaning of “one or both” would 
overwhelmingly convey the idea that one-parent SIJS cases were 
eligible.260  The proposed USCIS guidelines interpreting the meaning 
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of “1 or both” also indicate that one-parent SIJS applications are 
allowed.261  Even the New Jersey court in H.S.P. admitted that many 
commentators and courts interpreted the provision that way, while 
Nebraska was alone in interpreting otherwise.262  Although none of 
these are persuasive on their own right, the existence of documents 
from advocates, government, the ABA,263 and courts, even before In 
re Erick M., strongly suggests that the one-parent SIJS interpretation 
better captures what the words would ordinarily mean.264 
The interpretation introduced in In re Erick M. may have also 
impermissibly minimized the meaningful variation derived from the 
shift in the language.  As previously noted, the 2008 provisions varied 
significantly from the original 1997 language: “eligible for long-term 
foster care”265 became “reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s 
parents is not available due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a 
similar basis found under State law.”266  The court used the baseline 
that federal regulation has always interpreted the 1997 provision to 
mean that “family reunification was no longer viable” and was 
reluctant to depart from this interpretation unless courts and 
administrative decisions ruled otherwise.267  However, the court does 
not offer a reason to be so cautious when the language between the 
two provisions is so different.  The Nebraska argument is that the 
inclusion of one is to allow applicants who have one parent but not 
the other. 
However, the Nebraska court did not sufficiently distinguish its 
interpretation from two parent SIJS cases: the court could find that 
one parent abandoned the child and that the other parent also 
abused, neglected, or abandoned the child.  Effectively, the court’s 
interpretation that SIJS is unavailable to children who have a “safe 
parent” with whom they can reunify seems to nullify the 2008 
amendment because it ultimately interpreted the “one or both” 
language as a variation of a two parent SIJS evaluation.268  That would 
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be contrary to the legislative intent identified in In re Marcelina M.-
G.: that the shift from the 1997 to the 2008 language meant to move 
the inquiry beyond simply two-parent SIJS evaluations.269 
Even the court in In re Erick M. did not rely on its textual 
interpretation to conclusively hold that its decision represented the 
statute’s plain meaning.270  The court merely used this interpretation 
to consider the phrase ambiguous and open to other tools of 
interpretation.271  For example, one canon of interpretation that the 
Nebraska court did not consider was that ambiguities in immigration 
statutes should be resolved in the immigrant’s favor.272  Ultimately, all 
three courts turn to legislative history to help determine the 
provision’s actual meaning.273 
The New Jersey court in H.S.P. used a form of interpretation that 
relied more heavily on legislative history.274  The New Jersey court 
evaluated competing textual interpretations and then used the 
legislative history to selectively invalidate statutory interpretations 
that contradicted what it found to be the legislative intent.275  The 
New Jersey approach places less emphasis on the text itself, but it 
runs the risk of mistakenly imputing the legislation’s meaning from 
one legislator’s words and comments without providing the proper 
context.  Members of Congress vote for many reasons, and the 
Congressional record did not provide a direct explanation of most 
relevant phrase that needed to be interpreted: the “1 or both” 
language.276 
In fact, the Nebraska and New Jersey courts both analyzed the 
legislative history of the SIJS provisions that, compounded with their 
interpretation of legislative intent, painted an inaccurate picture of 
what was actually happening to children at that time.277  From their 
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analysis, the 1990 SIJS provisions were too broad and the 1997 
provisions intended to curtail the relevant language, limit the type of 
beneficiaries, and avoid abuses in the law.278  Both courts also 
proposed that their interpretation of legislative intent supported their 
interpretation of the text itself.279  Senator Domenici’s concerns280 
about the 1990 SIJS provision and the potential for abuse, however, 
did not significantly reflect reality.  The actual pool of successful SIJS 
beneficiaries remained low in comparison to all immigrants under the 
age of twenty-one.281  Best estimates by immigration attorneys suggest 
that roughly several hundred acquired SIJS.282  The numbers were 
generally not significant in a way that some feared they would be.283 
Although Nebraska and New Jersey correctly point out that some 
members of Congress were concerned about possible fraud and 
manipulation of the system, it is not clear that the addition of the 
“abuse, neglect, or abandonment” language quelled these concerns.  
The language was equally likely intended to clarify the law’s true 
beneficiaries.  However, clarifying that the law’s beneficiary is a 
person who suffered abuse, neglect, or abandonment does not 
categorically rule out one-parent SIJS cases because a court order 
would still need to find that he or she in fact suffered from abuse, 
neglect, and abandonment.  It is also an unlikely interpretation that 
the 1997 language of abuse, neglect, or abandonment was a restrictive 
addition.  At the time, the general understanding was that the 
beneficiaries of SIJS were primarily children who suffered from 
abuse, neglect, or abandonment and the statute sought to protect 
children in need.284  The addition of the “abuse, neglect, and 
abandonment” language more accurately reflects the evolving 
understanding of advocates, courts, and government regarding 
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obtaining legal permanent residence status, only 1,609 obtained legal status through 
SIJS.”); Jackson, supra note 49, at 22 (noting that in 2010, 1492 gained lawful 
permanent residence through SIJS compared to the 1,042,625 people that acquired 
lawful permanent residence); In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d at 723. 
 282. Porter, supra note 48, at 444. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 448. 
954 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
immigrant children, their identities, and what that implies for 
immigrant children’s rights, liberties, and needs.285  Instead, the likely 
and actual candidate for effectuating the intention of avoiding abuse 
in SIJS, as New York correctly points out, was the addition of the 
consent provision.286  Furthermore, given the courts’ limited role in 
making predicate orders and the federal government’s clearly 
accepted power over immigration, imputing the role of limiting and 
identifying fraud and abuse seems more logically located in the 
federal government’s hands.287  Immigration authorities more 
appropriately employ the type of gatekeeping analysis used in In re 
Erick M. and H.S.P. when entertaining concerns over immigration 
fraud or abuse.288 
In H.S.P. the court acknowledged that the legislative history 
analysis was not compelling on its own, and included more direct 
language from the congressional record during the TVPRA’s 
passage.289  One problem with legislative history is that it may impute 
meaning from legislators’ past statements that may no longer reflect 
the present legislators’ intent.290  Eleven years passed between 1997 
and 2008.  The more recent statements made in the Congressional 
record may better reflect the legislators’ intent instead.291 
When evaluating the congressional record for the TVPRA, the gist 
of the argument in H.SP. was: (1) Senator Feinstein claimed that the 
act did not expand the children’s current immigration rights, and (2) 
other legislators’ goal was to modify provisions that otherwise allow 
for increased illegal immigration and immigration fraud.292  The first 
issue with the court’s analysis of 2008 congressional records is that it 
takes Senator Feinstein’s comment out of context.  Right before the 
                                                                                                                 
 285. See infra Part III.C. 
 286. See Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir. Domestic 
Operations, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions 3 (Mar. 
24, 2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/
Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf; see also Ooi, supra note 
14, at 890. 
 287. Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2. 
 288. Id. 
 289. H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 267–68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014). 
 290. Compare Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(citing Senator Pete Domenici’s concerns over immigration fraud), with 147 CONG. 
REC. S101-02 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) 
(emphasizing improving access to SIJS and current forms of relief). 
 291. See 147 CONG. REC. S101-02 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Dianne Feinstein). 
 292. See supra Part II.C. 
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bill’s passage, Senator Feinstein took the time to thank her fellow 
legislators and highlight a part of the bill that was important to her.293  
During that speech, she specifically highlighted the part of the bill 
that provided for improvements in the procedural treatment of 
unaccompanied immigrant children in detention.294  That part of the 
bill did not in fact expand on any immigration rights of children.  If 
viewed out of context, Senator Feinstein’s statement contradicts the 
actual bill because it “expands on the immigration provisions of [the 
Traffic Victims Protection Act 2000].”295  The Senator spoke directly 
to the legislators’ intent as to the SIJS provisions when she introduced 
the bill in 2007.296  One purpose, which the accompanying text of the 
Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act explained, was to 
streamline SIJS.297  As the New Jersey court correctly pointed out, 
other legislators made sure to modify provisions that would 
encourage illegal immigration and immigration fraud.298  Congress 
was familiar with the language in the Non-Reunification Finding 
under the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act,299 and it 
remained unchanged upon passage, suggesting that Congress had 
acquiesced to such language. 
B. Addressing Gatekeeping Concerns Related to the Expansion 
of Special Immigrant Juvenile Status to Include One-Parent SIJS 
Even after reviewing the text and legislative history, external 
concerns still bothered some courts.  These concerns act as a gloss 
over how the courts interpreted the provisions or their application.300  
One concern about the expansion of SIJS is the potential increase of 
fraudulent or dubious claims in front of the state courts.301  However, 
the final decision on an applicant’s immigration status still rests with 
                                                                                                                 
 293. See 154 CONG. REC. S10886-01 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Sen. 
Dianne Feinstein). 
 294. Id. 
 295. See 153 CONG. REC. H14098-01 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Lamar Smith).  For example, the TVPRA added waivers to grounds of 
inadmissibility for special immigrant juveniles seeking legal residence.  See LEE ET 
AL., supra note 2, at 6. 
 296. 153 CONG. REC. S3001-01 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2007) (statement of Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein). 
 297. Id. 
 298. H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014). 
 299. See supra Part I.D. 
 300. See supra notes 215–35 and accompanying text; H.S.P., 87 A.3d at 268 
(expressing concern over laws becoming a “gateway” to more migration). 
 301. See H.S.P., 87 A.3d at 267. 
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the federal government.302  The concern with dubious claims also does 
not apply uniquely to one-parent SIJS cases.303  Instead, any case that 
comes to the state courts could potentially face the same problems of 
a lack of evidence, difficulty locating or serving particular parties, and 
a willingness by even opposing parties to default judgment in the 
custody claim.304  There is little reason for state courts to concern 
themselves with the following issues unless they view their roles in the 
process as gatekeepers of the United States borders, instead of as 
experts in the applicant child’s welfare and permanency.305 
There are some concerns that such an expansive definition would 
necessarily result in an increase in migration to the United States.306  
The enactment of SIJS provisions in 1990 similarly did not cause an 
increase in migration.307  Similarly, an increase in forms of relief for 
Soviet refugees in the United States did not increase migration.308  
Specifically for SIJS, it is unlikely that a child would intentionally 
suffer abuse, neglect, and abandonment just to acquire eligibility for 
status.309  Even if immigration laws themselves caused an increase in 
immigration, state courts have not traditionally been the enforcers of 
the United States borders; their role in SIJS is to focus on 
implications concerning welfare for the applicant requesting SIJS 
findings.310 
A review of the text’s plain and ordinary meaning suggests that 
one-parent SIJS is the more ordinary and plain interpretation of the 
2008 SIJS provision.  Furthermore, a review of the current legislative 
history strongly suggests that concerned legislators did not object to 
the expansion of SIJS provisions.  Moreover, interpreting the 
meaning of “1 or both” to include one-parent SIJS cases expands the 
substantive law in relation to what was allowed in the past, but it does 
not confer a “free pass” into the United States, as the singular finding 
is balanced by other considerations. 
                                                                                                                 
 302. See Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2. 
 303. See Carr, supra note 42, at 157 (speaking generally about immigration law). 
 304. Id. at 150, 157. 
 305. See Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2 (noting that the gateway role belongs to 
the immigration agencies). 
 306. Although it is difficult to divine what the future may hold for an expanded 
definition, a comparative look at Canadian policy suggests that a more open policy on 
its own does not affect the level of migration into the country. See Carr, supra note 
42, at 149. 
 307. See supra Part I.E. 
 308. Ooi, supra note 14, at 906. 
 309. Id. 
 310. The court’s role is to make predicate findings. See In re Marcelina M.-G., 973 
N.Y.S.2d 714, 719, 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
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C. One-Parent SIJS Is the Best Answer for Unaccompanied 
Immigrant Children 
In determining the best approach to adjudicating cases that 
necessarily affect children’s futures, state courts have taken an 
important position that a strictly textual reading of the TVPRA 
would undermine.311  Even if the text or the legislative history is 
insufficiently persuasive, the one-parent SIJS reading provides the 
best interpretation of the provision. 
The one-parent SIJS interpretation of the “1 or both” language is 
consistent with the meaning of TVPRA in light of the circumstances 
surrounding its passage, regarding the development of the 
immigration system built around unaccompanied immigrant 
children.312  It is also consistent with the plain meaning of the phrase 
“1 or both.”313 By limiting the interpretation of the TVPRA language, 
courts undermine the effect of a  movement toward a standard of 
policy, construction of identity, and treatment of children that is 
currently present in the unaccompanied immigrant children system. 
A question for the court necessarily includes what its proper role is 
in making these interpretations.  Principles of statutory interpretation 
are persuasive because they give deference to the text on which the 
majority voted through legislative action.  Yet, the courts should also 
consider their important function as a check against the limitations of 
majoritarian rule.314  Unaccompanied immigrant children are unable 
to participate in the political process and cannot be part of the 
majority at all.315  They are apolitical and citizens with limited rights.316 
Due to their identity as immigrants and as children.  Their 
                                                                                                                 
 311. See id. at 723 (stating concern over children’s welfare and not just 
immigration status determinations, the court noted that “[t]he expansion in the 
definition of SIJS to allow a juvenile court to consider the non-viability of family 
reunification with just one parent, rather than both, permits ‘more vulnerable and 
mistreated children to qualify for this form of relief’”). 
 312. See supra Part I.D. 
 313. See supra Part I.D. 
 314. The Supreme Court has considered such a question when considering 
protections for racial minorities. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 315. See Joyce Koo Dalrymple, Seeking Asylum Alone: Using the Best Interests of 
the Child Principle to Protect Unaccompanied Minors, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
131, 137 (2006). 
 316. M. Aryah Somers et al., Constructions of Childhood and Unaccompanied 
Children in the Immigration System in the United States, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & 
POL’Y 311, 328 (2010). 
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marginalization from the political process creates a particular 
vulnerability that courts should weigh against other concerns.317 
One way that courts have made effective progress, without 
overreaching their role in the tripartite governing system, is to 
consider different underlying constructions that influence legislative 
and agency action.318  Such a consideration is fitting for the judicial 
branch.  Relative to the other branches, the courts tend to focus on 
analyzing the logic, reasoning, and the underlying principles and 
paradigms that influence the meaning of legislation.319  The evolution 
of SIJS provisions and the general immigrant child system reflect an 
evolving construction of children’s identities.320  Under the INS, the 
framework governing unaccompanied immigrant children’s treatment 
reflects the threatening construction of children’s identity.321  One 
characterization of the INS framework explains that unaccompanied 
immigrant children are generally dangerous threats to scarce 
resources and are disposable because their rights and dignity as 
people can be violated with little recourse.322 
The Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement reflected a different 
paradigm.323  In one way, the agreement reflected the dependency 
construction of the child’s identity.324  Provisions in the agreement 
suggest that children are persons in need of minimum services and 
require the establishment of a system solely dedicated to meet such 
needs.325  In another way, the Agreement also introduced the 
                                                                                                                 
 317. See Ooi, supra note 14, at 907. 
 318. See Somers et al., supra note 316, at 331. 
 319. Supreme Court justices have expressed since the beginning of the United 
States that the task of judges is to say what the law is and interpret them. See, e.g., 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 320. See Somers et al., supra note 316, at 326–28; see also Jacqueline Bhabha, 
Demography and Rights: Women, Children and Access to Asylum, 16 INT’L J. 
REFUGEE L. 227 (2004). 
 321. “This construction presents childhood as a site that is threatening, 
burdensome, or disposable.” Somers et al., supra note 316, at 330. 
 322. See id. at 339; see also Thronson, supra note 55, at 1013. 
 323. See generally Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, No. CV85-
4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/
immigrants/flores_v_meese_agreement.pdf; see also Elizabeth M. Frankel, Detention 
and Deportation with Inadequate Due Process: The Devastating Consequences of 
Juvenile Involvement with Law Enforcement for Immigrant Youth, 3 DUKE F. FOR L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 63, 73 (2011).  
 324. “The dependency construction presents childhood as a site for having the 
needs of the child met while also limiting the agency of the child.” Somers et al., 
supra note 316, at 326. 
 325. Id. at 339–40. 
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autonomous and developmental construction.326  The Agreement 
provided for acculturation and adaptation services to allow children 
to develop independently and responsibly.327  Additionally, it included 
assessment programs to evaluate the child’s personal goals, strengths, 
and weaknesses, while also recognizing the child’s right to privacy and 
religion.328  The continued development of the shelter system under 
the framework of the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement has the 
potential to promote even more possibilities for respecting a child’s 
autonomy and agency.329  The Stipulated Flores Settlement 
Agreement introduced a perspective of the child’s identity that better 
balances the concern that children are developing persons, who have 
a limited ability to assert their rights.330  SIJS is equally 
groundbreaking and is characterized by some as “a radical break from 
the dominant modes of thinking about children in immigration 
law.”331 
One perspective that In re Erick M. and H.S.P. did not consider is 
the possibility that the adoption of the “1 or both” language could be 
equally influenced by the paradigm shift from a threatening 
construction to an autonomous construction of the child’s identity.  In 
some ways, the New Jersey and Nebraska courts’ focus on the 
possibility of fraud and abuse332 in the system attempts a revival of the 
threatening construction—the two courts construct every new 
opportunity or chance given to persons as an opportunity for them to 
undermine the system.  Otherwise, concerns over the parents’ 
procedural rights seem to be an important but secondary concern to a 
system that the legislators sanctioned and built to center on the child. 
Through the TVPRA, Congress codified the best interest 
determination and placed children in the least restrictive setting, 
which was the framework established by the Stipulated Flores 
Settlement Agreement.333  The question is open as to whether or not it 
                                                                                                                 
 326. “The developmental construction presents childhood as a progression of 
cognitive and psychosocial development towards adulthood” while “[t]he 
autonomous construction presents childhood as a space of autonomy and agency.” Id. 
at 325, 328. 
 327. Id. at 340. 
 328. Id. 
 329. In one of the shelters, the children are able to elect a representative that could 
convey concerns and grievances to the shelter administrators. Id. at 349. 
 330. See Thronson, supra note 55, at 1002. 
 331. Laura P. Wexler, Note, Street Children and U.S. Immigration Law: What 
Should Be Done?, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 545, 574 (2008). 
 332. See supra Parts II.A, II.C. 
 333. Somers et al., supra note 316, at 356–57; Wendy Young & Megan McKenna, 
The Measure of a Society: The Treatment of Unaccompanied Refugee and 
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also means that Congress is moving towards accepting the 
autonomous and developmental construction underlying the 
Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement.  The Unaccompanied Alien 
Child Protection Act combines both systems together under one 
banner.334  It is an opportunity for courts to consider such a question.  
By choosing to further the autonomous construction of children, 
courts simply are choosing to give children greater dignity as human 
beings.  Most courts incorporate this approach in their analysis and 
treatment of the “1 or both” language, which results in a conclusion 
that is more consistent with the developing unaccompanied 
immigrant child system.335 
State courts are also in a unique position as experts in family law 
and their understanding of the meaning of the SIJS provisions, as is 
recognized by the SIJS statute.336  Although SIJS is governed by 
federal legislation, the law’s provisions clearly indicate a space for the 
role of state courts based on their expertise in the realm of family 
                                                                                                                 
Immigrant Children in the United States, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247, 253 (2010) 
(“[The] TVPRA states that an unaccompanied child in HHS custody ‘shall be 
promptly placed in the least restrictive setting . . . .’”). 
 334. Senator Dianne Feinstein’s first introduction of the Act carries many of the 
ideas that influenced the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement and the Special 
Immigrant Juvenile Status provisions:  
Unaccompanied children are among the most vulnerable of the immigrant 
population; many have entered the country under traumatic circumstances.  
They are unable to protect themselves adequately from danger.  Because of 
their youth and the fact that they are alone, they are often subject to abuse 
and exploitation . . . .  Because of their age and inexperience, 
unaccompanied alien children are not able to articulate their fears, their 
views, or testify to their needs as accurately as adults can.  Despite these 
facts, the U.S. immigration laws and policies have been developed and 
implemented without careful attention to their effect on children, 
particularly on unaccompanied alien children.  
146 CONG. REC. S9381-05 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein).  The Senator continues: 
The Flores agreement requires that the INS treat minors with dignity, 
respect, and special concern for their particular vulnerability.  It also 
requires the INS to place each detained minor in the least restrictive setting 
appropriate to the child’s age and special needs. . . .  As a nation that holds 
our democratic ideals and constitutional rights paramount, how then can we 
continue to avert our attention from repeated violations of some of the most 
basic human rights against children who have no voice in the immigration 
system?  We should be outraged that children who come to the U.S. alone, 
many against their will, are subjected to such inhumane, excessive 
conditions. 
Id. 
 335. See, e.g. In re Marisol N.H., 979 N.Y.S.2d 643, 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014); In 
re Marcelina M.-G., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
 336. See Thronson, supra note 55, at 1004. 
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law.337  SIJS is unique in that it is a hybrid scheme, wherein the 
collaboration between federal government and state government 
allows both to exercise their expertise.338  The traditional notion that 
federalism entails a division of labor has persisted in the 
characterization of family law and Congressional deference of child 
welfare to states.339  Such a division of roles has resulted in the federal 
system lagging behind state courts in the substantive and procedural 
developments in family law.340  Particularly, immigration law that has 
a prominent effect on the child’s life and child’s relationship with her 
family tends to lack the consideration of the “best interests of the 
child.”341  Immigration courts, in general, are not at all specialized or 
expert enough to effectively use a child-centric approach.342  The 
treatment of unaccompanied immigrant children in the immigration 
system is a notable exception that has been borne from the work of 
advocates who are in fact familiar with family law.343 
Given Congress’s history of deference to states in matters of child 
welfare,344 courts should consider that Congress’s silence in the 
legislative history of SIJS does not necessarily limit the way that 
courts may also exercise their expertise relative to family law.  The 
court’s expertise in developing the standard of the “best interests of 
the child” in cases involving children is one of the reasons why courts 
defer SIJS findings to state courts.345  Child custody laws in all states 
have a “best interests of the child” standard, and such an approach 
has been in development since the twentieth century.346  Courts have 
considered the “best interests of the child” when making 
determinations in abuse and neglect proceedings, and they assign 
guardians ad litem to the child to protect the child’s best interests.347  
No single standard for the “best interests of the child” can be 
                                                                                                                 
 337. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012) clearly indicates that court findings are 
required for determinations of abuse, neglect, and abandonment, but not for other 
inquiries such as consent and return to the country of origin. See also Porter, supra 
note 48, at 447–49. 
 338. See Thronson, supra note 55, at 1004–05. 
 339. See id. at 1004. 
 340. See Porter, supra note 48, at 453. 
 341. See Thronson, supra note 55, at 1003. 
 342. See id. at 1005. 
 343. See supra Part I.A. 
 344. Nothing in the Constitution gives the federal government explicit power over 
matters of child welfare, and it may be a power strongly reserved to the states. See 
Porter, supra note 48, at 454. 
 345. See Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2. 
 346. See Carr, supra note 42, at 124–25; see also Dalrymple, supra note 315, at 142. 
 347. See Carr, supra note 42, at 125–26. 
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determined among the fifty states, but it is clear that it at least 
prioritizes the child’s safety, permanency, and wellbeing.348 
SIJS evaluations do not adequately consider the “best interests of 
the child.”  Although the law provides for a “[determination] in 
administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the 
alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous 
country of nationality or country of last habitual residence,”349 the 
best interest finding required by the SIJS provision does not include 
all the factors that a court normally considers when evaluating the 
“best interests of the child.”350  The “best interests” finding is limited 
primarily because it is a negative consideration.351  The best interest 
finding is specifically to determine when it is not in the child’s best 
interest to return to the country of origin.352  Conversely, in custody 
determinations, courts have more discretion to make decisions about 
a child based on the “best interests of the child” standard.353 In the 
custody context, a best interest consideration encompasses far more 
variables than what the limited SIJS analysis allows.  In considering a 
child’s best interest, a court may look at a variety of factors, and the 
decision may be more complex than a binary determination of 
whether a child gets to stay in one place over another.354 
A concern for the child’s safety and well-being portrays the child as 
dependent on third party intervention and support, which echoes the 
dependency construction.355  Considering the safety and well-being of 
the child in immigration matters would be a modest shift that is 
already consistent with the court’s concerns in non-immigration 
proceedings that relate to the welfare of children.356  On the other 
                                                                                                                 
 348. See id. at 126–27. 
 349. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii) (2012). 
 350. Other considerations include the well-being, safety, and permanence of the 
child while the particular provision in SIJS is limited to such inquiries related to a 
child’s return home. See Carr, supra note 42, at 127. 
 351. Compare Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Treatment of Unaccompanied 
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 352. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii). 
 353. See Carr, supra note 42, at 125–26. 
 354. See Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 
3. 
 355. See Somers et al., supra note 316, at 326–27. 
 356. See Carr, supra note 42, at 125–26. 
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hand, limiting a child, who has suffered abuse, neglect, and 
abandonment at the hands of one parent from reuniting with another 
parent, with whom the child may have a chance to develop a 
permanent and safe relationship, is an arbitrary foreclosure of the 
child’s best interest.  It is also an especially harsh line to draw in 
making determinations affecting a child’s life, especially given the 
apparent reason and context of the child’s migration to the United 
States. 
Additionally, the lack of uniformity among the states regarding the 
definition of “1 or both” unequally grants necessary relief to some 
children who have experienced abuse, neglect, and abandonment but 
not to others.357  The number of children that receive the special 
immigrant status of SIJS has been historically low,358 partly due to the 
split in state definitions.  A notable example is the different age-out 
and jurisdictional requirements of states for dependency on juvenile 
courts.359  Another split in state definitions would present further 
procedural hurdles that deny relief to children exposed to additional 
exploitation and instability.360  Moreover, such a concern also reflects 
the intent of Congress to respect federalism in the same way it defers 
to courts for family law determinations.361  Because the federal 
government is not an expert in the child’s permanence and stability, 
courts must also respect that the federal nature of immigration law 
requires some uniformity in the outcome for all children, regardless of 
forum.362 
Most courts correctly exercise their role and function in the 
immigration system when contemplating and allowing one-parent 
SIJS cases.363  It seems only human to consider the consequences of 
abuse and neglect experienced by SIJS applicants if they were to be 
denied special immigrant status even when the SIJS applicant cannot 
viably reunify with at least one parent.364  One of the more recent 
appellate division cases that affirmed the interpretation favoring one-
parent SIJS reasoned that “[a]lone, without either parent or their 
maternal grandmother, the children would face the prospect of having 
                                                                                                                 
 357. See Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2. 
 358. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 672; see also Jackson, supra note 49, at 22. 
 359. See Johnson & Yavar, supra note 257, at 77. 
 360. See Johnson & Stewart, supra note 2. 
 361. See Johnson & Yavar, supra note 257, at 76. 
 362. See id. 
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to protect themselves from violent gang members.”365  Such a concern 
reflects the court’s careful consideration of children’s lives, and not 
just a blanket argument used to open the borders for more 
immigration.  In another case, the court underscored the goal of relief 
from parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment as the purpose of SIJS, 
and also cautioned that such a law may expose potential SIJS 
applicants to other forms of violence while they journey to the United 
States.366  More importantly, such a concern better reflects the trend 
in domestic family law to incorporate the “best interests of the child” 
and to prioritize the safety, well-being, and permanency of children.367 
In examining SIJS and the legal framework governing 
unaccompanied immigrant children as a whole, courts also have the 
opportunity to consider the humanitarian function that SIJS serves.368  
The “best interests of the child” standard was adopted from family 
law and was expanded upon by international law for largely 
humanitarian reasons.369  The idea that SIJS encompasses such 
concerns is also fairly modest.  SIJS already waives most other 
exclusionary provisions that would generally apply in other parts of 
immigration law “for humanitarian purposes, family unity, or when it 
is otherwise in the public interest.”370  Furthermore, in the twenty-first 
century, children are recognized global citizens with explicitly defined 
rights and protections.371  We should increasingly look at the 
phenomenon of child migration as a global responsibility. 
The best interests standard is a general rubric for applying and 
evaluating a child’s well-being.372  It is not only the overarching 
doctrine of U.S. family law, but also of international human rights 
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of SIJS and the increased risk to unaccompanied immigrant children coming to the 
United States. 
 367. See Carr, supra note 42, at 125–26. 
 368. See Adelson, supra note 17, at 83. 
 369. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 354 (“In all actions 
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”). 
 370. Adelson, supra note 17, at 83 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h) (2006)). 
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norms.373  The most relevant law relating to the welfare of children is 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).374  The United 
States has stalled ratification of the CRC, and there are proponents 
and deterrents of such ratification.375  However, courts are in a unique 
position as political bodies in carrying out SIJS, which reflects a 
compromise between ratification and CRC principles,376 as well as 
representing the welfare of the children that cannot participate in the 
political process that is required for ratification.377  Although the 
United States has not ratified the CRC, signing the treaty obligates it 
to refrain from enacting legislation that would undermine the CRC’s 
objective.378  Particularly, Article 3 of the CRC provides that “in all 
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration.”379  The CRC and the CRC Committee directly 
provide guidance for the treatment of unaccompanied and separated 
children.380  The guidance heavily reflects the concepts of rights and 
dignity in the Stipulated Flores Settlement Agreement and the focus 
on family reunification, which one-parent SIJS embodies.381 
CONCLUSION 
Courts should adopt the one-parent SIJS interpretation.  Congress 
enacted SIJS in 1990 to give relief to child migrants who suffered 
from abuse, neglect, and abandonment.382  The numbers of children 
who are migrating to the United States recently have increased 
unrelated to developments in immigration law.383  Such a 
development highlights the importance of increasing access to rights 
and legal relief, such as SIJS.384  After enactment of the TVPRA in 
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 374. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 354. 
 375. Wexler, supra note 331, at 565. 
 376. See id. at 574. 
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note 315, at 149. 
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2008, the common understanding of the improved language was that 
one-parent SIJS cases would qualify.385  However, the introduction of 
decisions by New Jersey and Nebraska courts complicated this 
common understanding.386  Yet, the text of the statute clearly supports 
the idea that children should be able to reunify with one of their 
parents if they have experienced abuse, neglect, or abandonment in 
the hands of the other.387 
The statute’s legislative history supports the idea behind the one-
parent SIJS interpretation, and reflects a larger paradigm that gives 
children more dignity, respect, personhood, and human rights.388  
Allowing the one-parent SIJS cases to qualify not only has great 
implications in terms of giving more children access to rights that they 
deserve, it also helps highlight the importance and respect that the 
United States has so far given to the international human rights 
system.389  Family law and juvenile court judges are not gatekeepers of 
our country’s borders, but are individuals concerned with the child’s 
permanence and welfare. 
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